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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant, Benjamin D. Morris ("Morris"), is represented by Starr Kelso of
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.

Respondents-Defendants, Hap Taylor & Sons ("Hap

Taylor") and Liberty Insurance Co. ("Liberty" or "Surety"), are represented by
Kent W. Day of Boise, Idaho.
An Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
was entered by Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh on February 7, 2012. Prior to
issuing its Order the Commission received Claimant's Motion to Set Aside Lump
Sum Settlement Agreement dated November 30, 2011, along with an
accompanying Memorandum. AR 218-244.

Defendants filed a Response and

Memorandum dated December 9,2011. AR 245-250. On February 7,2012, the
Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission") unanimously found that Claimant
had not presented sufficient evidence of fraud to allow the setting aside of the
January 19, 2010, lump sum settlement agreement. AR 385-389.
Morris did not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission and
this appeal followed.
A.

Course of Proceedings

Morris originally filed a Worker's Compensation Complaint asserting
entitlement to medical benefits, temporary total disability benefits, permanent
partial

impairment and/or disability benefits, and vocational rehabilitation

benefits. A.R. 13. The Complaint was filed by Attorney James P. Hannon. Id.
Defendants responded by stating that Morris's current condition was under
investigation as to whether it was causally related to the October 18, 2006,
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industrial accident. AR. 16. On March 3, 2008, Morris sent a letter to Attorney
Hannon informing him that legal services were no longer required.

AR. 58.

Attorney Hannon subsequently filed a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record
which the Industrial Commission granted on March 14, 2008. AR. 56, 59.
Morris retained Michael Walker as an attorney and a Stipulation For
Substitution of Counsel dated March 12,2008 was filed. A.R. 61-62. Attorney
Walker filed a Request for Calendaring on May 12, 2009 indicating the issues to
be heard as above with the addition attorney fees and temporary partial disability
benefits. AR. 67. Hearing was set for January 5,2010. A.R. 75.
The Industrial Commission issued an Order Vacating Hearing on
December 29, 2009, as it was agreed by the parties that the claim had settled.

AR. 90. The proposed lump sum settlement agreement was submitted to the
Industrial Commission on January 4, 2010.

AR. 308.

The Industrial

Commission issued its Order of Approval and Partial Discharge upon a Lump
Sum Payment dated January 19, 2010. AR. 260-275.
Almost 18 months later attorney Starr Kelso filed a Notice of Appearance
and a Motion to Review Lump Sum Settlement Agreement on July 8, 2011. R.

AR. 1, 3. Kelso requested the Industrial Commission review the executed lump
sum agreement to determine whether or not the approval of the agreement
constituted a manifest injustice towards Morris.

AR. 1, p. 3.

It was further

requested the Industrial Commission order additional medical and temporary
total disability payments and review the attorney fees paid by Morris to determine
whether or not they were improper. A.R. 1, p. 4-5. After the filing of affidavits by
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Appellant's

father,

attorney Kelso,

and

attorney Walker,

the

Industrial

Commission issued its Order Denying Motion to Review Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement dated November 1, 2011. AR. 214-216. Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside Lump Sum Settlement Agreement was thereafter filed on December 2,
2011. A R. 218-219.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Morris was involved in an October 18, 2006, industrial accident. AR. 13.
Morris was struck in the head by a rock weighing approximately 25 pounds. R.
Vol. 1, p. 55.

He sustained an occipital scalp laceration, closed head trauma

with mild concussion and cervical strain. R. Vol. 2, p. 310.

A few months

following the injury, on May, 21, 2007, Dr. Karen Stanek met with Morris and
found he had no physical deficits other than poor posture and muscle tension.
R. Vol. 2, p. 318.

Morris underwent a psychological consultation with Daniel S. Hayes,
PhD, and John A. Wolfe, PhD, on July 17, 2007. R. Vol. 1, p. 40. Morris's father
reported that operating a motor vehicle was difficult and Morris was unable to
manage himself independently at that time. R. Vol. 1, p. 40. It was determined
that Morris was still recovering from his head injury and was unable to function
independently. R. Vol. 1, p. 44. Additional evaluation by Dr. Woife determined
Morris had severe depression that was impacting his functional abilities and
should be referred to a vocational rehabilitation program. R. Vol. 1, p. 53-54. Dr.
Gerald Gardner, PhD, met with Morris on April 22, 2008, who self-reported that
he was able to drive alright and usually took himself to medical appointments. R.
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Vol. 1, p. 61. Despite physical independence, he reported requiring his girlfriend,

Mary, to handle his finances and keep track of time-loss payments. R. Vol. 1, p.
61. Dr. Gardner felt many of Morris's deficits would persist but that he had no
impairment of reality. R. Vol. 1, p. 64. The following month, Morris attended an
independent medical examination with Dr. George Lyons who felt Morris had
reached maximum medical improvement regarding his cervical strain, but
reserved further comment until he underwent treatment for his head injury. R.
Vol. 2, p. 327.

In July 2008, Morris was reevaluated by Dr. Stanek who felt he would
benefit from additional therapy, both physical and cognitive, and Botox injections.

R. Vol. 1, p. 65. She further opined Morris should be able to return to some form
of viable employment. R. Vol. 1, p. 65. On December 2, 2008, neurologist Dr.
George Lyons and neuropsychologist Dr. Craig Beaver issued a panel report. R.
Vol. 2, p. 328.

They assessed a 10% Whole Person Impairment for Morris's

injury. R. Vol. 2, p. 336. They opined Morris was capable of returning to work,
however, permanent restrictions of not working in unprotected heights and
avoiding environments similar to that in which he was injured would be
appropriate. R. Vol. 2, p. 336.
Dr. Stanek gave an 18% Whole Person impairment as opposed to the
10% rating originally issued by Dr. Lyons and Dr. Beaver. R. Vol. 2, p. 231. Dr.
Stanek also agreed with the work restrictions set forth by Dr. Beaver and Dr.
Lyons in that Morris should be limited to light-moderate to light duty work based
on his head injury and neck pain. R. Vol. 2, p. 232.
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The Social Security Administration informed Morris in November 2009 that
he would begin receiving disability benefits, less amounts owed in child support.

R. Vol. 1, p. 69. Dan Brownell, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, met with
Morris on December 15, 2009, concluding that he was capable of some work
and finding that Morris possessed skills in landscaping, however he was unable
to return to any type of landscaping that fell within heavy-duty employment. R.
Vol. 1, p. 115.

Brownell identified other limiting factors as interpersonal

challenges and anger management. R. Vol. 1, p. 115. At the time of his report,
Mr. Brownell opined Morris had a 50-55% loss of access to the labor market,
above his current impairment. R. Vol. 1, p. 115. Following the report, Attorney
Walker offered to settle Morris's case for $68,000.00. R. Vol. 1, p. 116. Liberty
countered with an offer of $54,381.00, with the understanding that medical
benefits were to be left open. This was accepted by Morris. R. Vol. 1, p. 117.
The settlement agreement was signed by Morris on January 4, 2010, and
approved by the Industrial Commission on January 19, 2010. R. Vol. 1, p. 89-90.
The agreement outlined that all issues were settled "with the exception of future
medical treatment required for injuries sustained in the October 18, 2006,
incident and any TTD and/or TPD benefits that Claimant may be entitled to as a
result of the causally related future medical treatment." R. Vol. 1, p. 81.
Morris met with Dr. Stanek once more on January 15, 2010, and it was
recommended he follow-up at St. Luke's Pain Clinic for return to work
assistance. R. Vol. 2, p. 236. He continued to treat with Dr. Stanek who would
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refer him to Dr. Watanabe regarding steroid injections into the neck. R. Vol. 2, p.
236.

On June 21, 2011, Morris's father, Harold Dean Morris, filed an Affidavit
indicating he went to most of the medical appointments as Morris was unable to
do so himself.

R. Vol. 1, p. 156.

Attorney Starr Kelso filed a Notice of

Appearance and a Motion to Review Lump Sum Settlement Agreement on July
8, 2011. R. Vol. 1, p. 1, 3. Kelso requested the Industrial Commission review
the executed lump sum agreement to determine whether or not the approval of
the agreement constituted a manifest injustice towards Morris. R. Vol. 1, p. 3. It
was further requested the Industrial Commission order additional medical and
temporary total disability payments and review the attorney fees paid by Morris to
determine whether or not they were improper. R. Vol. 1, p. 4-5.
Shortly thereafter on July 19, 2011, Attorney Walker filed an Affidavit
indicating he had no idea Starr Kelso represented Morris until the filing of his
Notice of Appearance on July 11, 2011, and Walker was still under the
impression that he represented Morris. R. Vol. 1, p. 167. This was 17 months
after the partial lump sum settlement agreement had been approved by the
Industrial Commission. Walker further reported he was never informed Morris's
father was to have control of the decision making, only that he was sometimes
present for discussions about the claim.

R. Vol. 1, p. 169. Walker reported

Morris appeared to understand the settlement discussion and the outline of
options when they were explained to him.

R. Vol. 1, p. 170.

Morris asked

relevant questions both on his own and in the presence of either his father or
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girlfriend, neither of whom ever indicated Morris was unable to make his own
decisions regarding his claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 171.
During settlement negotiations, Morris was informed that if the claim was
not settled, Uberty would proceed towards hearing. R. Vol. 1, p. 171. Morris
made the decision to settle the indemnity portion of his claim but requested the
medical side be left open, to which Liberty agreed. R. Vol. 1, p. 171. Walker
made no indication Liberty's offer was "overly generous" but instead outlined the
litigation process that they would undertake should Morris decide to not accept
the settlement offer.

R. Vol. 1, p. 172. No documentation was ever provided

that indicated Morris' father had legal authority to make financial decisions on his
son's behalf. R. Vol. 1, p. 173.

A.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, the Court views
all the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed
before the Industrial Commission, Lutrell v. Clearwater County Sheriffs Office,
140 Idaho 581, 583, 97 P.3d 448, 450 (2004).

When the Court reviews a

Commission decision, it exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews
questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence
supports the Commission's findings." Id. Substantial and competent evidence is
"relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161,
164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996).

The Industrial Commission's conclusions

regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the

Respondents' Responsive Brief-- Page 11

conclusions are clearly erroneous. Zapata v. J.R. Simp/ot Co., 132 Idaho 513,
515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues before the Court are:
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in approving a lump sum

settlement agreement that allegedly did not comport to the requirements of
Judicial Rule of Practice and Procedure Rule 18.
2.

Whether the Industrial Commission erred by denying Appellant's

Motion to Set Aside Lump Sum agreement without holding a hearing.
3.

Whether appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees.
ARGUMENT

A.

The Industrial Commission did not error in approving a Lump
Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) that did not set forth in
detail in the text of the agreement that the Commission had
considered claimant's medical and employment status.

In Appellant's Motion before the Commission he first contended that the
January 19, 2010 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) was void because
there was no language setting forth claimant's current medical status and
employment status as set forth in Judicial Rule of Practice and Procedure Rule
18(C)(1 )(c). The Commission held that while the text of the agreement itself may
have not set forth in detail claimant's medical status and employment status the
Commission was apprised of those facts with the supplemental information
supplied by the parties by their respective attorneys. The Commission responded
by stating that the purpose of the requirements of current medical status and
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employment status under JRPP Rule 18 are to ensure that the Commission was
informed such that it has the information on which to make a determination. The
Commission went on to hold that it had been apprised of the information it needed
in order to determine whether to approve the settlement. The Commission cited its
review of medical

reports,

rehabilitation

reports,

impairment ratings and

neurological reports. It stated that it was well aware that claimant suffered a head
injury, that claimant suffered impairment, and that the claimant suffered permanent
disability. They also cited the fact that the agreement left medical benefits open
for all future related claims. A.R. 386.
In his argument Appellant does not point out that the case was reported
settled to the Industrial Commission in late December of 2009 and the proposed
agreement was actually provided to the Industrial Commission on January 4, 2010.
His reliance on the non-consideration of what he deems to be the most current
medical and employment information i.e. the January 15, 2010 medical report of
Dr. Stanek is misplaced.

There is certainly no evidence that the Commission

reasonably could have had that medical document at the time of the settlement
review. The surety didn't even receive the report from the physician until well after
the settlement had been approved. See Exhibit A, attached, showing the subject
medical report was received on January 25, 2010. A summary of this particular
chart note is in the record. A.R. 236.
The jurisdiction

of this Court is

limited when

reviewing

workers'

compensation cases to those matters specifically set forth in IC 72-732.
Claimant's allegations regarding the Commission's supposed noncompliance with
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a rule that they promulgated in order to have the parties supply adequate
information to the Commission for its consideration in reviewing and approving
proposed settlements does not establish that the Commission acted in excess of
its powers under IC 72-508.
As is typical in contested workers compensation cases, there were
conflicting medical opinions in the record regarding the seriousness of claimant's
head injury and post concussive headaches and what the impairment and
restrictions arising out of those conditions were. See A.R. 348-354; report of IME
physician Dr. Krafft.

Those medical records were also considered by the

Commission prior to approving the settlement. The statement by the Appellant
that the current medical and employment status were not in the record is a red
herring. This case was reported to the Commission as having been settled in late
December 2009 and a signed proposed LSA was submitted to the Commission on
January 4,2010, along with supporting documentation. A.R 308. The suggestion
that the Commission should have considered the January 15, 2010, report of Dr.
Stanek is illogical in that it always takes time for such reports to arrive in the hands
of the parties and the Commission, and such report was not even in the hands of
the parties in this case until almost the end of January of 2010 after the
Commission had approved the proposed LSSA. Even had the Commission had
that document it certainly is nothing but conjecture to argue that receipt of that
document would have changed the Commission's decision regarding whether to
approve the LSSA. As noted, there was certainly contradictory medical evidence
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with regard to the question of medical stability that had been submitted. A.R. 346354.

Traditionally, this Court has not required the Industrial Commission to
adhere to strict rules of procedure and evidence in its hearings. Hagadone v.
Kirkpatrick, 66 Idaho 55, 154 P.2d 181 (1944); Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho 151,

540 P.2d 1330 (1975); Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647,603
P.2d 981 (1979). This Court should not insert itself into the internal workings of the
Industrial Commission by a holding that the Commission is bound to strictly comply
with a rule that was clearly intended for the parties to the litigation and not the
Commission itself. Additionally, Appellant was not prejudiced by the non-inclusion
of a statement in the LSSA that the Commission had considered the current
medical and employment status of the claimant, especially in light of the fact that
the Commission has affirmatively held in its memorandum that it did do so.
The Commission has broad authority under Idaho Code §72-508 to
promulgate, interpret, and follow rules and procedures governing its judicial
matters. That authority is not limited by statutory grants of affirmative authority to
handle specific matters in specific ways. The only limitations on the Commission's
authority to promulgate and adopt rules governing its actions in its quasi judicial
role are imposed by statutory prohibitions. Claimant has failed to show that the
Commission has run afoul of any statutory provision by approving the parties
negotiated agreement and that approved agreement should not be disturbed on
appeal.
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B.

The Industrial Commission did not error in denying Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or in
not holding a hearing on the matter.

Idaho Code §72-404, entitled "Lump Sum Payments" allows either the
employer or the claimant to apply for a lump sum payment, as opposed to periodic
payments, to settle a claim. The Commission is ultimately empowered to either
approve or deny the application based upon whether it determines a lump sum to
be the best interest of all parties. Once a lump sum compensation agreement is
approved by the Commission, that agreement becomes an award and is final and
may not be reopened or set-aside absent allegations and proof of fraud. IC §72718. Harmon v. Lutes Construction Company, Inc.. , 112 Idaho 291, 293, 732 P.2d

260,262 (1986). This Court in Harmon, supra, recited:
The only ground sufficient to permit the Commission to set aside
claimants award would be allegations and proof of fraud on the part
of employer's surety in procuring the agreement. 112 Idaho at 293.
In denying the Motion, the Commission relied on the holding of Harmon,
112 Idaho at 291, and Rule 60(b)(3), IRCP that provides the Court may relieve a
party from a final judgment if there was "fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party." Contrary to appellant's assertions, respondents
believe that the fraud referred to in IC 72-732(3) has consistently been held to be
limited to proof of fraud on the part of the employers surety in piOcuring an LSSA.
This court so held in Harmon, supra.

Respondents believe that without such

evidence having been offered to the Commission, there are no viable grounds for
a discussion of any error committed by the Commission in not setting aside the

LSM.
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In an action attacking the Industrial Commission's decision, IC 72-732 sets
forth the standard of review. As indicated in Harmon v. Lutes, supra, the Court
reiterated that whether fraud has been proven by clear and convincing evidence is
for the determination of the trier of fact and on appeal that determination will not be
reversed where supported by competent, substantial, though conflicting evidence.
Substantial competent evidence need not be un-contradicted, nor does it need to
necessarily lead to a certain conclusion; it need only be of such quantity or quality
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder. See
Mann v. Safe way Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,736,518 P. 2d 1194, 1198 (1974).

The record here indicates that the Commission considered appellant's
allegations of fraud in the alleged context that claimant's prior counsel had given
advice to the appellant about the monetary value of the settlement and prior
counsel's opinion as to the value of the claim and the questionable outcome
inherent with litigation. Respondent's view is that attempting to set aside the LSAA
based on alleged fraud of one's own attorney presents a question of first
impression for this Court.
In the proceedings below, the Commission found that the alleged
statements by the appellants previous counsel about the settlement were not
made by the appellant, but rather by the current attorney himself. They implicitly
found that the statements of the attorney were not adequate representations such
that they could use them to establish the representation element of fraud. They
found that in spite of the current attorney's concerns that the claimant might not be
competent to sign an affidavit, no evidence had been presented to document any
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incapacity of the claimant to testify. They therefore had no representations they
could use to establish the representation element of the cause of action and
concluded that therefore, there was no evidence before them which they could
legitimately rely on to support a finding of fraud.
Even had the Commission been willing to consider the statements by the
new attorney, as opposed to statements by the party himself, as statements or
representations of fact there clearly was conflicting evidence on the question as to
whether the statements assigned to the former attorney by the new attorney or the
father of the appellant were accurate.

Former attorney, Walker, provided an

affidavit stating that he did not tell the claimant that the settlement offer was "overly
generous." AR. 172. Walker indicated that the claimant appeared to understand
the process and the settlement discussions. AR. 174. Walker indicated that after
his discussions with his client, Morris directed him to accept the surety's settlement
offer. AR. 172. He testified by affidavit that he never discussed the settlement
with the appellant's father as was indicated by the father. AR. 173.
The Commission made a finding that they did not find statements made by
attorney Walker to be false. False statements by the attorney would be required to
support any finding of fraud against him.

The Commission's findings and

conclusions that there was no actionable fraud, based on the submitted affidavits,
is certainly supported by substantial competent evidence and therefore should not
be disturbed on appeal.

Vogt v. Western General Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 782,

718 P.2d 1220 (1986). The only issue this Court can decide is whether the
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Commission's finding, that the claimant had failed to prove actionable fraud, is
clearly erroneous. Sadiku v. Aatronics Inc., 142 Idaho 410,128 P.3d 947 (2006).
Based upon the evidence in the record, respondents submit that the
Commission's finding that actionable fraud was not proven, is clearly not
erroneous. The evaluation and weighing of conflicting testimony is a function left
to the sound discretion of the Industrial Commission as fact finder, and will not
be disturbed on appeal by this Court unless clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
Nycum v Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858, 712 P.2d 559 (1985).

In the presence of conflicting evidence in worker's compensation
proceedings, this Court has consistently recognized the Industrial Commission
as the arbiter of those conflicting facts, and acknowledged that the weight to be
accorded evidence is within the Commission's particular province. Nelson v.
Pumnea, 106 Idaho 48, 675 P.2d 27 (1983).

The LSSA signed by Appellant was approved by the Commission, and no
rehearing or reconsideration was requested within twenty days.

Under IC 72-

718, Appellant could only set aside the lump sum agreement by showing fraud.
The Industrial Commission properly considered the affidavits before it and
rendered its unanimous memorandum decision dated February 7, 2012.

No

statute or rule required the Commission to hold a hearing and the Commission
itself found that based on the evidence already presented there was no need for
a hearing. Whether to hold a hearing in this context was solely and completely
within the discretion of the Commission. Where a motion in front of the Industrial
Commission is heard on affidavits and written records alone and no oral
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testimony is taken, the appellate court is in as good a position to evaluate the
showing made as was the lower tribunal and can exercise its own discretion in
passing on the matter. See Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d
903 (1974).
As indicated in the Commission's memorandum decision, claimant's new
attorney's allegations indicated that claimant was supposedly unhappy with his
prior counsel. The Commission held that if Claimant has concerns with his prior
representation that certainly he was free to seek recourse as may be available to
him in other venues but that the Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to
address that issue. It was evident from the affidavit of prior attorney Walker that
he had been told he had the actual authority to settle the claim pursuant to the
claimant's instructions.

See Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 92 P. 3d 1076

(2004).
Respondents believe that where express authority is conferred by the client,
an attorney may settle any matter in the case, and his actually doing so is binding
on the client. Respondents also believe that a client is bound where he accepts a
settlement based on the advice of his attorney even if the attorney was allegedly
negligent in offering such advice as long as the attorney had actual authority,
express or implied, to compromise the claimant's claim. Caballero v. Vlikse, 140
Idaho at 332.

The only recourse in this type of situation would be an action

against the attorney for alleged malpractice in causing the settlement to be
accepted.
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C.

Appellant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on
appeal.

Regardless of the outcome of other issues in this appeal, Respondents
should not be ordered to pay attorney fees. Respondents clearly have reasonable
grounds to ask the Court to affirm the Industrial Commission's rulings in not setting
aside the LSAA in this case.

IC 72-804 fees are only payable when the

Commission or any Court hearing a workers compensation proceeding determines
that the employer or his surety contested the claim for compensation "without
reasonable grounds."
CONCLUSION
Because the Commission's decision to not set aside the previously
negotiated and approved Lump Sum Settlement Agreement is consistent with
Idaho law, the Commission's ruling should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this

).lo~

day of September, 2012.

LAW OFFICES OF HARMON
& DAY

Kent VV. Day
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the.,2~~day of September, 2012, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the following by the
method indicated:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d' Alene, 1083816
X First class mail, postage prepaid

D Hand delivery
D Express mail
D Fax transmission

Kent W. Day
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NW Medical RehabilitatiOfl
1315 N. Division
SptJkane, WA 99202

Phone: 509-624-0908

Fax: 509-459-0881

DATE : 01118/2010

RE: Benjamin D Morris
DOS: 07/24/1976

'i'I' &1)5 - 2-1 DZ 3 I

Annette Vargason, CClSe Manager
Libe.r1y Northwest
Fax: 1-800-256-3856
Dear Ms. Yorgason:
I am writing on beholf of my patient, Benjamin Morris. Unfortunately, there

has not been a successful closure to this claim and my patient has not been
able to rerum to some type of vocation despite his wish to do so . I feel this is
due to the lack af success for Ben to participate in a comprehensive
rehabilitation program where his persistent symptomology, both real and
perceived, could be adequately addressed. I had hoped that the program in
Boise would have been the solution. but referral did not result in a successful
admission into their program. ±am therefore recommending referral to the
outpatient pain clinic program at St. Luke's Rehabilitation . I h<lve enclosed a
copy of my last office note for your review. Please let me. know of your
decision as soon as possible. Thank you for your consideration. Should yO<.l
require additional information or assistance please contact my office at 509624-0908.

Sincerely,

KAS/bim

p
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10/18/2006

NW Mediall Rehabilitation
~3~5 N. Division
Spokane, WA 99202
Phone: 509-624-0908
Fax: 509-4S9-0B8~
DATE OF SERVICE: 01/15/2010
PATIENT NAME: Benjamin D Morris
PATIENT DATE OF BIRTH:
REFERRING PHYSICIAN: Michael . Ludwig
ASSISTANT: Brenda .M unroe, l1A
ALLERGIES: Pristiq, Ambient Hydrocodone
Seroquel, Trazodone
CURRENT MEDICATIONS: * Prevacid - 30 mg 1 po qd* Lexapro - 10 mg QD
REASON FOR VISIT: Two month follow up evaluation
CHIEF COMPLAINT:
1. PQrsistent headaches
2. Persistent jaw, neck, and upper back pain
3. Difficulty sleeping
4. Nightmares have resolved
5. Persistent dizziness
6. Easily frustrated
I

HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: Benjamin is a 33-year old male who
sustained head and neck injuries on 10-16-06 after being struck in the
back of his head with a 25-pound rock while working on the job. He was
wearing a hard hat at the time of the accident, but the hat was
punctured by the rock and he sustained an occipital laceration, which
has since reso1ved.
Ben arrives in clinic accompanied by his father. He reports that he has
a DVR appointment scheduled for the 20th. He has not been succeBsfu~ in
re-establishing services with Dan Brownell. He states that he attempts
ca~~ing Dan once per week. He fee1s unmotivated in moving forward dUQ
to unreso1ved pain involving his neck and back , as well as persistent
headaches and dizziness. He is convinced that something ~s st21~ wrong.
He does not handle stress, as well as he used to before the accident.
His memory ski~~s remain poor. His father states that Ben forgets he
has ~ken his me~ioations because he st1~1 hurter so he ends up over
medicating . This was the cause of his symptoms two months ago, which
had been determined by the emergency department as an overdose.
He reports that a settlement from his worker's compensation has been
offered and it has been recommended by his attorney, ~ke Walker, to
accept the offer . The understanding is that the medical portion of the
claim will remain open to allow ongoing treatment. Ben would like to go
to school or be retrained in some kind of vocation.

MEDICAL HISTORY: Past Medical History: History of reconstructive
surgery to face and nose in 2004. Significant for ankle fracturQ at age
21, and knee injury in 2004.
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Following the injury, he reports an incident of possible seizu=e
activity when he awoke during the night with his arms and legs shaking.
His girlfriend also witnessed the incident. He was admitted to the
emergency department at Kootenai Medical Center in April 2008 with
complaints of changes in mental status{ heart palpitations, and

paresthesia affecting one side. His blood sugar was found to bQ 449.
SUlJUIlary :
1. 10-30-06 TMJ evaluation by Dr. Erik GiLbert who diagnosed TMJ
arthralgia.
2. Referral to Dr. David Crowe, orthodontist who specialized in TMJ.
Appointment was missed by the patient and according to their office
policy, reschedu1ing is not an option.
3. 12-02-08: IME evaluation by Dr. Craig Beaver and concluded that
patient sustained a 10\ whole person impa~rment as a result o£ the
injury. He recommended further evaluation of the T.HJ as recommended by

Dr. George Lyons. Further recommendmtions included that the patient not
work in road construction with laying pipe or in work situation where
he ~s ~nvolvad with unproteoted height.
4. 09-26-08: Vocational assessment with Robert Cornell in which he
recommended that patient pursue additional education to upgrade his

math and Engl~sh skillS, as well as explore taking some basic computer
skills if he wishes to pursue other employment venues other than manual
labor. He also recommended on-the-job training or apprenticeship
training.
5. He had been working with vocational rehabilitat~on to find suitable

employment initially with Dan Brownell and then Roy Murdcck.
Past medications:
Seroquel, Trazodons, Naproxen r

F~exQrilt

Lortab, Soma F altracet,

Effexor.
SOCIAL HISTORY: Ban current1y lives in Coeur d'Alene with a roommate.
He is tobacco dependent. He denies alcohol or illicit drug use.

FAMILY HISTORY: Diabetes, hypertension
LABORATORY: 12-19-07: Glucose 121, monocytes, absolute 0.8B, all other
laboratory values were within normal

lim~ts.

RADIOLOGY: 11-09-06: CT scan of the brain negative for subacute
subdural hemorrhage. CT scans ~0-18-06: Ethmoid mucosa~ thiCkenings
cons1stent with sinus inflammatory disease.

Bony

man~le

is intact.

No fracture is seen.
The visualized maxillary sinuses appear well
pneUJllatized. No cervical fracture according to CT scan. Mild
degenerative changes at C4-C5 ~~d C5-C6 interspaces.
Soft tissue
laceration left posterior occiput. Multiple nasal fractures were
indicated on the facial CT scan, but this was followed by an addendum
indicting the distortion of the nasa~ bones was due to prior history of
nasal bone surgery. There was no acute fracture of the nasal bones.
Diagnostic Testing: 11-16-07: Video EEG captured a typical staring
spell and showed nO evidence of epileptic activity per Dr. Clinton
Horan. He said they were likely not seizures but sequelae related to
his post concuss1ve syndrome.

05-21-09: STARR program, which consisted of a two day evaluation in
which i t was determined that he was not appropriate for their program.
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Functional Status
THERAPY: No formal therapy at this time.
PAIN: Headaches, neck, upper back, and right jaw pain.
ADL's: Independent with activities of daily living although he
demonstrates poor compliance with his medication regimen due to poor
m.emory.
TRANSFERS: Independent
DIETARY: Independent with general diet and thin liquids without
swallowing deficits. He reports frequent difficulty with chewing on his
right side due to pain.
MOBILITY: Independent ambulation without assistive devices.
SLEEP: He reports poor sleep quality, however he states that his
nightmares have resolved.
Review of Systems
CONSTITUTIONAL:
Patient denies, fevers, Chills, loss of aPPEtite or
major change in weight.
HEENT: Headaches
Cardiovascular:
Patient denies chest pain, palpitations or dyspnea on
exertion.
PULMONARY: Patient denies chronic cough, shortness of breath or
coughing up blood.
GASTROINTESTINAL: He reports that vomiting and nausea is less frequent
sinoe initiating the Prevacid.
GENITOURINARY:
Pa tien t denies any bladder urgency, frequency or
gQni.ta~

sores.

ENDOCRINE; Significant for diabetes.
HEMATOLOGICAL:
Patient denies any excessive bleeding or bruising.
NEUROLOGICAL, Headaches and dizziness.
MUSCULOSKELETAL: Right jaw, neck, and upper back pain.
SKIN:
Patient denies any skin rashes, or itching.
PSYCHIATRIC: Depression and anXiety.
Physical Examination
B/P: 114/74 PULSE; 79 RESP, 15 WT: 242# OXYGEN SATURATION: n/a
GENERAL: No acute distress.
HE~: Normocephalic, atraumatic, pup~ls equal, no rh~norxhea.
NEUROLOGICAL: Cranial nerves II-XII grossly intact.
COGNITION: Oriented to day, time, person and place.
MUSCULoSKELETAL: Full active range of motion of the upper and lower
extremities bilaterally.
COUNSELING:
1. Depression
r feel a component of h~s failure to recover is dUG to unreso2ved
depress~on. I would ~ike to tr1al increasing his Lexapro dose to see if
this improves his mood and therefore his motivation.

2 .. Pi.2.zi.ness
He has complaints of unresolved dizziness that cou£d be related to an
inner ear dysfunction associated with his head injury. He has not been
evaluated by ENT to rule this out.

3. Failed recovery
He experiences persistent symptomology that has impeded a successful
return to work. Ben requires the structure and support of a

J
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comprehensive

rahabilitat~on

program that incorporates a number of

modalities to treat a myriad of symptoms. He would have benefited from
an inpatient program rather than outpatient, but referral to the E1k I S
program in Boise did not result in a successful admission to their
program. Therefore I am recommending adm~ssion to the outpatient pain

clinic progr~ at SLRI. Once the program has been completed, I
anticipate that he should be ready to successfully transition into the
work

forca~

Again the program should address the following:
1. Frequent headaches
2. Neck pain
3. TMJ
4. Decondi tioning
5. Diabetic management
6. Nutrition and weight loss
7. Psychological counseling to address depression, anger, and coping
skills
8~ Pat~ent education to mainta~n physical, occupational I
cognitive, and
nutritional skills upon discharge.
9. Vocational education and assistance
Impressi.on
1. History of mild brain injury

2. History of whiplash
3. Unresolved TMJ
4. Post concussive syndrome
5. Depression with anxiety
6. Diabetes
7. Chronic neck pain and spasms
8. Chronic headaches
9. Nightmares
10. Dizziness

Plan
1. Referral recommendation for SLRl Pa~n Clinic for comprehensive
program to fac~litate return to work. Request for authorization sent to

Liberty Northwest.
2. Referral recommendation for ENT to address unresolved dizziness.
Request for authorization sent to Liberty Northwest.
3. Patient instructed to increase Lexapro to 20 mg per day to better
address depression.
4. Rx provided for Lexapro 20 mg #30 to be taken one tablet per day.
5. Patient to return to clinic for follow up evaluation 02-26-10 for
re-evaluation.
25 minutes of the 40 minute appointment was spent in counseling and
coordination of care wi
e patient and his father.

cc: Julie Osler, Claims Manager,
CC: Dirne C~inic

FAX NUMBER: 1-800-256-3856
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